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Overview of Corruption Research in Construction  1 
Introduction  2 
The construction industry plays a vital role in shaping the world. However, this 3 
positive social image has been increasingly diminished by corruption issues 4 
(Transparency International2008). Corruption can ruin multiple levels of the industry 5 
and lead to low performance, including quality defects and increased costs of 6 
construction projects (Charles2009). This misconduct can also affect the development 7 
of the global construction market (Goldie-Scot 2008). In extreme cases, corruption 8 
results negative social effects with serious consequences. Uneke (2010) and Tabish 9 
and Jha (2011) stated that corruption violates the rule of law and public trust in 10 
government. Corruption has stirred growing concerns not only from developed 11 
countries such as the US (Sohail and Cavill 2008; Crist 2009), United Kingdom 12 
(Chartered Institute of Building Survey 2006), and Australia (Hartley 2009) but also 13 
from developing countries such as India (Tabish and Jha 2012) and Nigeria (Alutu and 14 
Udhawuve 2009). However, studies rarely provide a complete view of corruption in 15 
construction. Therefore, a systematic review of papers in first-tier peer-reviewed 16 
journals in Construction Engineering and Management (CEM) is deemed appropriate 17 
to understand key issues in corruption in construction. Specific questions to be 18 
addressed in this paper include the following: 19 
1. What is the coverage of corruption-related studies published in first-tier CEM 20 
journals in the period from 1990 to 2012? 21 
2. What are the future directions for research on corruption in construction? 22 
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Corruption in Construction 23 
Corruption is recognized as one of the major obstacles to economic and social 24 
development (World Bank 1997). In the construction industry, corruption may occur 25 
in any phase of a project, namely, project initiation, planning and design, bidding and 26 
construction, as well as operation and maintenance (Tabish and Jha 2011a). The 27 
construction sector is often deemed one of the most corrupt industries worldwide 28 
because of much information asymmetry between the client and other participants 29 
(Charles 2009). Sohail and Cavill (2008) reported that the annual estimated loss from 30 
corruption in the global construction market reaches about US＄340 billion, which 31 
accounts for 1% of the global construction market value (about US＄3.2 trillion). This 32 
figure suggests that considerable enterprise profit is wasted because of corrupt 33 
practices in construction. 34 
Sohail and Cavill (2008) revealed that corruption usually occurs for or a number or 35 
a combination of the following reasons: (a) substantial flow of public money, (b) 36 
competitive nature of the tendering process, (c) lack of transparency in the selection 37 
criteria for tenders, (d) political interference in cost decisions, (e) complexity of 38 
institutional roles and functions, and (f) asymmetric information between practitioners. 39 
Tabish and Jha (2011a) emphasized that lack of standardized execution of 40 
construction projects is also a major reason for corrupt practices in the industry. In 41 
addition, this form of misconduct is secretly accomplished and very difficult to detect 42 
because of lack of access to the relevant documents or stakeholders in the project 43 
(Tabish and Jha 2011a).  44 
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Corruption also impedes the adoption of corresponding prevention measures in 45 
advance. However, considerable effort from industrial associations, non-governmental 46 
organizations (NGOs), and international organizations have provided guidelines on 47 
preventing corrupt conduct and practice. The American Society of Civil Engineers 48 
(ASCE) promoted a “zero tolerance” policy to cultivate an anti-corruption culture in 49 
the construction industry (Crist 2009). In collaboration with the Global Infrastructure 50 
Anti-Corruption Centre (GIACC), Transparency International (TI) developed an 51 
integrated anti-corruption system, the Project Anti-Corruption System (PACS). The 52 
PACS employs a group of anti-corruption measures such as the appointment of an 53 
independent assessor, commitment of all participants, disclosure of project 54 
information, and use of anti-corruption agreements (Transparency International 2013). 55 
The World Economic Forum established a global Partnering Against Corruption 56 
Initiative to provide a platform that helps companies prevent corrupt practices (World 57 
Economic Forum 2013). Despite considerable attempts to prevent corruption in the 58 
construction industry, the practice continues to be a common global phenomenon, 59 
especially in developing countries (Goldie-Scot2008).  60 
Research Methodology 61 
To identify major research outputs published in first-tier CEM journals, the 62 
methodology adopted by Ke et al. (2009) and Hong et al. (2012) was replicated in this 63 
study. The research design included two steps, as follows:  64 
In Step 1, a list of first-tier peer-reviewed CEM journals was formulated as the 65 
source for identifying relevant papers according to the CEM journal ranking list by 66 
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Chau (1997). Selected journals included the top six journals in the ranking list of 67 
Chau: Construction Management and Economics (CME), Journal of Construction 68 
Engineering and Management (JCEM), Engineering, Construction and Architectural 69 
Management (ECAM), Journal of Management in Engineering (JME), Proceedings of 70 
the Institution of Civil Engineers: Civil Engineering (PICE-CE), and International 71 
Journal of Project Management (IJPM). A full search of relevant papers in each of the 72 
six journals was conducted using databases with a full collection of reports from 1990 73 
to 2012. The common keyword “corruption” was used in the Title/Abstract/Keyword 74 
field of search engines of databases such as ASCE Library, Taylor & Francis Online, 75 
SciVerse ScienceDirect, Emerald, and the ICE Virtual Library. The search results by 76 
relevance were as follows: CME (68), JCEM (67), ECAM (10), JME (27), PICE-CE 77 
(17), and IJPM (38). These identified papers were reviewed to examine their 78 
relevance to the topic. The results were refined, obtaining the following results: CME 79 
(11), JCEM (5), ECAM (2), JME (3), PICE-CE (2), and IJPM (2). 80 
In Step 2, a separate research was also conducted to identify more papers on 81 
corruption in construction by using Web of Science (WoS), Compendex and 82 
Engineering Index Backfile (CEIB) on Engineering Village, and the ASCE Library. 83 
These three databases are regarded as major citation sources of high-quality papers in 84 
construction engineering. WoS is the leading peer-reviewed literature web source 85 
worldwide, covering more than 10,000 journals (Lippi et al. 2012). CEIB provides 86 
bibliographic citations and abstracts of over 5,000 engineering journals and 87 
conferences in all fields of engineering (Xue et al. 2010). The ASCE Library is 88 
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regarded as the largest publisher in the world, providing information on civil 89 
engineering (Fitzgerald 2005). Common keywords, including “corruption” and 90 
“construction” were used in the Subject/Title/Abstract field of search engines in the 91 
three databases. The initial search result was as follows: WoS (95), CEIB (282), and 92 
ASCE Library (52). After excluding papers unrelated to the corruption topic and those 93 
already identified in Step 1, the results of relevant papers cited in these three 94 
databases were refined: WoS (18), CEIB (3), and ASCE Library (10). 95 
Finally, 56 papers were identified and validated as papers relevant to corruption in 96 
construction. Information on the 56 papers and their sources are listed in the Appendix. 97 
All searches were conducted in September 2012. 98 
Current Research Interests 99 
Based on a review of the 56 relevant papers, three research areas were identified as 100 
categories previous research on corruption in construction: forms of corruption in 101 
construction, impact of corruption in construction, and anti-corruption mechanisms 102 
and measures. 103 
Identification of Forms of Corruption in Construction 104 
Twelve forms of corruption in construction were identified from these 56 papers 105 
(Table 1). 106 
(Please insert Table 1 here.) 107 
Bribery is the most common and serious form of corruption in the construction 108 
industry, particularly in developing countries (Barco 1994). Bribery is regarded as a 109 
major corrupt practice, given that corruption refers to “offering, giving, receiving or 110 
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soliciting of anything of value to influence the action of an official in the procurement 111 
or selection process or in contract execution”(Shakantu 2006). With reference to an 112 
empirical survey in South Africa, Bowen et al. (2007a and 2007b) disclosed detailed 113 
information on how bribery is committed, revealing that it comes in the form of gifts, 114 
payments, overseas and holiday trips, special favors/privileges, and affirmative 115 
appointments. 116 
Fraud is also a common form of corrupt practice in construction. This practice 117 
mainly comes in the form of deceit, misinformation, invoiced and paid for materials 118 
those were never received, spurious request for a time extension, deliberate intention 119 
to mislead and withhold information, alteration of documents, and theft of materials 120 
(Vee and Skitmore 2003; Heuvel2005; Shakantu2006; Bowen et al. 2007a; Bowen et 121 
al. 2007b; Sohail and Cavill2008; Jong et al. 2009; Tabish and Jha 2011a; Bowen et al. 122 
2012). In two questionnaire surveys conducted in Australia and South Africa (Vee and 123 
Skitmore 2003; Bowen et al. 2007a; Bowen et al. 2007b), deceit and misinformation 124 
ranked first and second, respectively, as the most fraudulent conduct. As a major area 125 
in corruption research in construction, fraud has aroused significant research concern 126 
in previous studies (Table 1). 127 
Collusion is a form of corruption in which a secret agreement is reached between 128 
two or more parties for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. Collusion may benefit the 129 
involved parties but sacrifice the normal benefits of the project or the public (Bowen 130 
et al. 2007b). Most collusive practices are committed during project biddings and thus 131 
decrease the number of bidders and bid variance (Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore 2000). 132 
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Previous collusion practices mainly involve two key participants in the projects, such 133 
as “contractor and consultant, contractor and cost consultant, contractor and 134 
architect, client and consultant, and architect and suppliers” (Bowen et al. 2007a; 135 
Bowen et al. 2007b; Heuvel 2005). Zarkada-Fraser (2000) emphasized that collusion 136 
seriously corrodes the foundation of the competitive nature of the construction 137 
industry. 138 
Bid rigging is another major form of corruption that occurs mainly between a 139 
tenderee and a tender. In some cases, a tenderee intentionally specifies a very short 140 
time limit for preparing the bidding document to control the number of potential 141 
tenders. Thus, only a small number of tenders who have been informed earlier about 142 
the forthcoming bid can promptly submit the bidding documents. Some tenderees can 143 
also demand for unequal qualification requests to limit the number of tenders and help 144 
their favored tenders (Jong et al. 2009). Bowen et al. (2007a, 2007b) revealed 145 
common forms of bid rigging, including cover pricing, bid cutting, hidden fees and 146 
commissions, and compensating for tendering costs through unsuccessful bidders. 147 
Embezzlement is a crime in which a person fraudulently misappropriates or 148 
misapplies what is legally entrusted to that person for his or her own intent (Green 149 
1993). In the construction industry, a typical example of embezzlement is the 150 
misappropriation of project fund (Tow and Loosemore 2009; Ling and Hoang 2010). 151 
Embezzlement can seriously damage the cost management of construction projects 152 
(Sohail and Cavill 2008). For example, the payment for a contractor may be defaulted 153 
by the client’s embezzlement of the project funds, thereby delaying payment and 154 
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project delivery or even resulting in project failure. 155 
Kickback refers to illegal economic incentives that a person uses to seek a 156 
favorable decision from a person in power (Jong et al. 2009). For instance, a client 157 
staff may help a favored tender win a contract to obtain an economic reward from the 158 
tender. A recent questionnaire survey in Nigeria disclosed that the contractor winning 159 
the contract usually provides a price quotation that includes a kickback in the bidding 160 
(Alutu 2007). Kickbacks occur not only between contractors and owners. This form of 161 
bribery also occurs between architects and suppliers or between consultants and 162 
suppliers/ consultants, especially when the person in power can help suppliers win the 163 
contract by specifying the requirements of certain materials or construction techniques 164 
(Bowen et al. 2012). 165 
Conflict of interest refers to a situation in which a professional in a position of trust, 166 
such as a site supervisor, an auditor, or a cost consultant cannot fulfill his or her duty 167 
impartially because of ambivalent professional or personal interests (Bowen et al. 168 
2007a, 2007 b). Despite the lack of proof of improper activity, a conflict of interest 169 
can create an appearance of impropriety and thus undermine confidence in the 170 
professional to act properly in his or her position, which may negatively affect the 171 
public (Bowen et al. 2007a, 2007 b). 172 
Dishonesty and unfair conduct occur mostly in bidding, bureaucratic or government 173 
policy making, negotiations on consultancy fees and project costs, as well as contract 174 
negotiation and signing (Vee and Skitmore 2003). Bowen et al. (2007a, 2007 b) 175 
summarized the common complaints on dishonesty and unfairness from different key 176 
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participants in construction projects, as follows: “Architects believe that contractors 177 
are not always honest in abiding by contractual specifications, and that they 178 
commonly use cheaper, inferior alternatives. Contractors believe that the tender 179 
adjudication process is unfair, and that professionals act with bias when pressured by 180 
clients. Quantity surveyors believe that contractors repeatedly over-claim and that 181 
clients pressurize consultants to make savings on projects or cut their fees.” 182 
Extortion refers to corrupt conduct motivated by the desire for gain, usually in the 183 
form of forced extraction of bribes and asking for favors from vulnerable parties 184 
(Sohail and Cavill 2006). Extortion can occur as a requirement (a) from client staff to 185 
contractors or material suppliers, (b) from a major contractor to his subcontractor, (c) 186 
from a potential subcontractor to a material/equipment supplier, and (d) from 187 
regulatory/permitting agencies to clients, contractors, or material/equipment suppliers. 188 
Extortion can result in the misuse of project funds and provide some individuals an 189 
illegal income (Jong et al. 2009). Extortion can also diminish project quality and 190 
reliability. Thus facility managers and users can suffer from extortion. 191 
Negligence refers to corrupt conduct characterized by failure to exercise the degree 192 
of care that an ordinarily prudent and careful professional would exercise under 193 
similar circumstances (Richard 1972). Negligence is also a common form of 194 
corruption in construction. Specific forms of negligence include inadequate quality 195 
specifications, poor workmanship, insufficient safety specifications, low-quality 196 
materials, poor process supervision, and lack of project management and skills (Vee 197 
and Skitmore 2003). According to Bowen et al. (2007a, 2007 b), over 90% of 198 
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architects and cost consultants have committed negligence. Similarly, over 70% of 199 
contractors and consultants have observed professional negligence in construction. 200 
Front companies refer to corporate entities that are established by client staff to 201 
obtain illegal income from corrupt conduct (Jong et al. 2009). These companies are 202 
usually unknown to the public; however, their controllers usually hold senior positions 203 
in the government and may have influence on awarding public projects. The 204 
controllers may receive a very large share of bonuses from these companies, and this 205 
form mostly occurs in public projects (Jong et al. 2009). 206 
Nepotism refers to corrupt conduct by which a client staff may favor participants 207 
who have a closer relationship with him or her in terms of race, origins, and private 208 
relationships, among others (Kadembo 2008). Nepotism, also referred to as the “good 209 
old boys’ network,” (Singh and Shoura 1999) can have multiple negative effects on 210 
the success of construction projects, such as a decrease in construction productivity, 211 
deficiency in managerial ability, and lack of contribution to project success (Kale and 212 
Arditi1998). 213 
Impact of Corruption in Construction 214 
Based on 56 identified papers, previous studies on the impact of corruption on the 215 
construction industry focused on three areas: corruption risks in construction projects, 216 
expansion strategies of global companies in the international construction market, as 217 
well as social and economic effects. 218 
Corruption is an extremely significant risk in managing construction projects, 219 
particularly in managing project costs in developing countries, which usually lack 220 
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transparent and effective legislative and administrative system (Ofori 1999). Wang et 221 
al. (1999 and 2000) indicated that corruption is one major risk in managing 222 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects, adding that the major forms of corruption in 223 
BOT projects in China is the expenditure of corrupt officials. Similarly, public-private 224 
partnership projects of China also face a high risk in preventing corruption, which 225 
affects project success (Xu et al. 2010; Chan et al. 2011; Ke et al. 2011). Ling and 226 
Hoang (2010) obtained similar findings in Vietnam. Meduri and Annamalai (2011) 227 
added that corruption can lead to an increase in the cost of construction projects and a 228 
waste of public funds in India because of extra bribe payments. 229 
Corruption largely affects the expansion strategies of global companies in the 230 
international construction market (Ling and Hoang 2010). Barco (1994) viewed 231 
bribery as a common strategy taken by global companies to gain competitive 232 
advantage in foreign trade in the construction market. According to Tang et al. (2012), 233 
corruption combined with political and physical factors is critical for a company to 234 
enter successfully the international market. Despite large construction demand and 235 
enormous latent benefits in some developing countries, the level of corruption in a 236 
country may be one main consideration of global companies, particularly those based 237 
in developed countries, in deciding whether to enter a new construction market 238 
(Crosthwaite 1998). Therefore, corruption can obstruct global construction companies 239 
from entering new construction markets. 240 
Finally, corruption can affect the social and economic development of human 241 
societies worldwide. Empirical studies have revealed that corruption causes economic 242 
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problems and worsen economic crises in some European and Asian countries. Jimenez 243 
(2009) noted that corruption contributed to the speculative bubble in Spain. Romero et 244 
al. (2012) identified specific forms of corruption in town planning and urban 245 
expansion in Spain, such as blurring land lines between the public and private sectors, 246 
illegal use of insider information, and lack of transparency. Green (2005) emphasized 247 
that widespread corrupt practices in Turkish construction industry can worsen the 248 
catastrophe because these practices lead to a lack of adequate quality inspection and 249 
assurance. Badun (2011) affirmed that the low quality of infrastructure in Croatia is 250 
due to common corrupt practices in the construction industry. Corruption also hinders 251 
the development of society and economy in developing countries. For instance, most 252 
global contractors abandoned water and irrigation projects in Nigeria (Sonuga et al. 253 
2002) and road projects in Afghanistan (Unruh and Shalaby 2012) because of serious 254 
corruption in these two countries.  255 
Anti-corruption Mechanism and Measures 256 
Anti-corruption strategy is another research area on corruption in construction. 257 
Previous studies mainly involve four strategies: transparency mechanism, ethical code, 258 
project governance, and audit and information technology. 259 
Transparency mechanism is an effective strategy for preventing corrupt conduct in 260 
construction projects. Sohail and Cavill (2008) observed that transparency 261 
mechanisms can provide the public with access to information on construction 262 
projects so that project processes can be monitored by stakeholders, and decision 263 
makers can be held accountable for their decisions. Kenny (2012) indicated that 264 
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regular exposure of contract and implementation details is a common form of 265 
transparency mechanism. Goldie-Scot (2008) noted that some developing countries 266 
such as Tanzania, Zambia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have exerted considerable 267 
effort in introducing transparency initiatives to prevent corruption in construction 268 
projects. 269 
Ethical codes represent another important strategy to prevent corrupt practices by 270 
improving ethics and self-discipline in professionals. For instance, Australia 271 
developed a National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry to discipline all 272 
industry professionals and prevent corrupt transactions in construction projects 273 
(Hartley 2009). Goldie-Scot (2008) added that ethical behavior should be rewarded 274 
for constructing a positive industry atmosphere. Sohail and Cavill (2008) noted that 275 
ethical training may improve the implementation of a national ethical code and that 276 
developing an ethical code for a particular organization may be more useful because 277 
the industry ethical code cannot include exhaustive guidelines for all situations that 278 
different practitioners face in their work. 279 
Several measures for improving project governance can also prevent corrupt 280 
activities in construction projects. Kenny (2009) argued that separation of the 281 
ownership and regulatory functions of government in construction projects can 282 
effectively mitigate corruption because it can restore the competitive nature of the 283 
construction sector. Tabish and Jha (2012) proposed that the selection of qualified 284 
leaders can facilitate cleaning up of corruption, thereby contributing to project success. 285 
Harsh punishment should also be considered in the design of corruption prevention to 286 
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provoke real fear in practitioners (Tabish and Jha 2012). 287 
Audit and information technology also play an increasingly important role in 288 
corruption prevention in the construction industry worldwide. Sichombo et al. (2009) 289 
indicated that technical auditing in the pre-contract state of a construction project can 290 
minimize or prevent unethical practices in construction projects. Sohail and Cavill 291 
(2008) suggested that the Integrity Pact and information technologies widely applied 292 
worldwide can also positively affect corruption prevention. A debarment, which 293 
records companies and individuals found guilty of corruption, has been implemented 294 
by European Union (EU) member countries to prevent the corrupt companies and 295 
individuals from participating in EU projects (Jong et al. 2009). 296 
Some international and industry associations have exerted substantial efforts in 297 
promoting a combination of anti-corruption mechanism and measures to prevent 298 
corrupt conduct in the construction industry. For instance, TI attempted to address 299 
corruption across the construction industry by producing a set of tools and reports in 300 
2005 and subsequently developed PACS in 2007 to assist project participants 301 
(Krishnan 2009). The International Federation of Consulting Engineers proposed a 302 
comprehensive Business Integrity Management System and a parallel Government 303 
Procurement Integrity Management System for consulting firms (Boyd and Padilla 304 
2009). The Global Infrastructure Anti-corruption Center (GIACC) established the 305 
GIACC Resource Centre to provide free access to information, advice, and tools 306 
designed to help stakeholders understand, prevent, and identify corruption. The ASCE 307 
has adopted a series of corruption prevention measures such as organizing a 308 
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Committee of Global Principles for Professional Conduct and an Engineer’s Charter, 309 
including anti-corruption topics in annual meeting programs and making a policy 310 
statement 510 entitled “Combating Corruption” (Crist 2009). In the UK, an 311 
Anti-Corruption Forum that comprises nearly all key local industry associations such 312 
as the Institution of Civil Engineers, Chartered Institute of Building, Royal Institution 313 
of Chartered Surveyors, and Association of Consulting Engineers has been held 314 
annually since 2003 and provided various publications on practical measures for 315 
combating corruption in construction (Goldie-Scot 2008). 316 
Future Research Directions 317 
Based on the review of 56 papers, three areas are identified to provide main directions 318 
with a rich domain for future research: corruption in developing countries, corruption 319 
risk identification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies. 320 
Corruption in developing countries 321 
The construction industry in developing countries faces a greater challenge in 322 
corruption prevention because of its lack of mature legislative and administrative 323 
system. Goldie-Scot (2008) evaluated the impact of corruption on developing 324 
countries as more devastating than that on developed countries. Thus, this topic has 325 
aroused increasing research concern worldwide. For instance, identification of forms 326 
of corruption in construction has been investigated with growing frequency in South 327 
Africa, Nigeria, and India (Alutu2007; Bowen et al. 2007a and b; Alutu and 328 
Udhawuve 2009; Ameh and Odusamj 2010; Tabish and Jha 2011a; Bowen et al. 2012). 329 
This area is predicted to be a significant research opportunity. 330 
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Identification of Corruption Risk  331 
Corruption risk identification is another emerging research area on corruption in 332 
construction. According to Zou (2006) and Sichombo et al. (2009), auditing 333 
techniques can detect corrupt practices in construction projects. However, these 334 
techniques cannot predict corruption risks, thereby preventing the adoption of proper 335 
measures against these risks. A systematic technique should be developed to identify 336 
corruption risks in managing construction projects. This area deserves futher research. 337 
Evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies 338 
Corruption prevention is a complex issue. Thus, no one-fits-all strategy can address 339 
all forms of corrupt conduct in construction projects. Wang et al. (2000) evaluated the 340 
effectiveness of some anti-corruption strategies such as maintaining a close 341 
relationship with government agencies, establishing joint ventures with local partners, 342 
and writing anti-corruption requirements into contracts by an empirical survey. None 343 
of these strategies received high evaluation from industrial practitioners. Therefore, 344 
the effectiveness of strategies proposed by governments, NGOs, and industry 345 
associations should be evaluated, and the fit between the specific forms of corruption 346 
and their solution strategies should be examined further.  347 
Conclusions 348 
This paper represents a critical review of 56 papers on corruption in construction 349 
within the 1990 to 2012 period. These papers were selected from six top construction 350 
journals (CME, JCEM, ECAM, JME, PICE-CE, and IJPM) and three influential and 351 
reliable academic search engines (WoS, CEIB, and ASCE Library)., Three categories 352 
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were identified to summarize current research interests in corruption research in the 353 
construction industry: identification of forms of corruption, impact of corruption on 354 
construction, and anti-corruption mechanisms and measures. These papers fully 355 
reflect the development and different perspectives of this filed, thereby establishing a 356 
platform for future research by providing a general view of corruption research in 357 
construction in the past two decades. 358 
Three areas for future research on corruption in construction were identified and 359 
proposed for future inquiry and development: corruption in developing countries, 360 
corruption risk identification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption 361 
strategies. Corruption in construction is an emerging field with global concerns. Thus, 362 
more advanced and significant endeavors should be focused on this area for advanced 363 
knowledge and informed practice in the future.  364 
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